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BRUNEI
TheASEAN Connection
Donald E. Weatherbee
Although no formal mechanism for accession has yet
been announced, it is expected by Brunei and its future partnersthat the
Sultanate will become the sixth member of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1984, after it obtains full sovereignty over its
externalaffairs.'The characteristicASEAN decision-making process of formal and informalconsultations (musyawarah)leading to consensus (mufakat)
is in full train.Brunei'scandidaturewas announced at the June 1981 annual
ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Manila. Brunei was invited as an
"observer"and was representedby the Sultan's brother,Prince Mohammad
Bolkiah, who is the PerdanaWazirand probably will be Brunei's first Foreign Minister. In his address to the conference, Prince Mohammad stated
that it was the hope of Brunei that the question of its membership in
ASEAN could be favorably resolved once independence was achieved.2 If
the statements of ASEAN leaders to date are any guide, there would appear
to be little doubt that when Brunei makes its application,it will be accepted.
In fact, membershipin ASEAN may be the sine qua nonof Brunei'sindependence.
Brunei'sinclusion in ASEAN will markthe first enlargementof the group
since the original five (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the
Philippines)signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Brunei is not the only
potential member. Sri Lankahas openly campaigned for membership,to the
private distress of ASEAN leadership. Although questions of geographic
proximity are raisedconcerning Sri Lanka'swould-be ASEAN role, it would
seem that other considerations are more significant in determining the generally negative reactions in ASEAN. Papua New Guinea too is associated
with ASEAN, but its prospects for full membership,even if it desired, would
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not seem bright. Brunei as a candidate, however, seems to have all of the
qualifications. Geographically it is part of the Malaysian-Indonesiancore
area in Southeast Asia. Culturallyit is Malay-in Islam, language, and customs. Most importantly,the perception in Indonesia and Malaysia is that
regional security and stability require Brunei's incorporation into the
ASEAN framework. Brunei's candidate status is primarily a function of
political necessity, economic and culturalcriteriabeing secondary.
The country itself is a mini-state with petroleum punch. Once one of the
greatest of the archipelago Malay states, Brunei's history from the 17th to
the 19th centurieswas one of incrementalpartitionuntil finally,in 1888, the
Sultanate,largely confined to its present borders, accepted a British protectorate as the only way to forestall absorption into either Brooke's Sarawakor
the domains of the North Borneo Company. This was followed in 1904 by
the appointment of a British Resident to advise the Sultan in all matters
except Islamic law and Malay custom. The Resident became a High Commissioner under the 1959 Agreement which was amended in 1971 to provide for full internalself-government.
Brunei has a land area of 2,226 square miles not wholly contiguous. The
northerndistrict of Temburong(503 squaremiles) is separatedfrom the rest
of the state by the projection to Brunei Bay of that part of Sarawak'sFifth
Division known as Limbang.This approximatelyone thousand squaremiles
was grabbed by the second Raja Brooke in 1890, after the protectorate had
been established. The cession was never acceded to by the Brunei government. The issue was raised in 1967 by Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin, and
after his abdication, by his son, the present Sultan, Sir Muda Hassanal Bolkiah, 29th in the line, who forcefully and publicly reassertedBrunei's claim
to Limbang in a 1970 radio address in which he stated: "Bruneiand Limbang are not separated because Limbang belongs to Brunei."3 Bruneian
maps do not show any boundary between Brunei and the Limbang district
of Sarawak.
Brunei'spopulation according to the 1981 census is only 192,000, some
34,000 fewer than the 1980 population estimate based on extrapolations
from the 1971 census figure of 136,000.4 About one-quarterof the population is ethnic Chinese of whom more than 30,000 are stateless. The exchange of notes that accompanied the 1979 Treatyof Cooperation
and Friendship between Britain and Brunei5 detailing independence arrangements
included an understandingthat once British responsibility for British protected persons in Bruneiis terminated,those who have permanentresidence
in the state will continue to have residence and will be granted International
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Certificatesof Identity for travelpurposes. Nevertheless, some unease exists
in the Chinese community given Brunei'sstringentnationalitylaw and limits
on propertyrights. Alreadythose who can afford it are emigrating.There has
been some concern expressed that a post-independence flight of Chinese to
Singapore might "erode ASEAN's multi-racialcohesiveness."6 On the other
hand, given Brunei's limited population and continued reliance on immigrant labor, there seems little logic for the adoption of policies that would
alter arrangementsof long standing to the disadvantage of a minority that
plays a vital role in the economy and labor force.
The people of Brunei have the highest per capita income in the ASEAN
region, more than US $11,000 per year. This figure, of course, only illustrates Brunei'srelativewealth and small population, not income distribution.
In a series of five year plans, major investments have been made in a social,
welfare, and economic infrastructurethat has significantly changed Brunei
society. The current1980-84 plan calls for expenditureof B $1,700 million,
more than double the B $760 million in the 1975-79 plan. (The Brunei
dollar is at par with the Singapore dollar and is worth approximately US
$.48.) There is some subsidy support for lower prices for food and fuel.
More showy projects include a new stadium, which will hold a quarterof the
total population at one seating, and the new royal palace. Brunei'stransportation and communications links have been extended with the deep water
port at Muaraand a new airport,with a 12,000-foot runway,at BandarSeri
Begawan, the capital. Royal Brunei Air operates an expanding number of
regional routes with Boeing 737s. By the end of 1983, Brunei,which already
has color television, will have a ground station giving it satellite transmission
capabilities. Still, Brunei's wealth cannot be absorbed in Brunei and the
government runs huge annualsurpluseslargerthan annual expenditures.An
international Investment Advisory Board recommends the foreign investment of these surpluses.
Brunei'swealth is the product of the activities of Brunei Shell Petroleum,
in which the government of Bruneiholds a 50%shareof the equity. Since the
first well startedpumping at the Seriafield in 1929, BSP has produced nearly
1.7 million barrels of oil. Its reserves are given as more than 1.6 million
barrels.7At currentratesof production of about 180,000 barrelsper day, this
is more than a twenty-yearreserve. Production is below its highest rate of
268,000 b/d in 1979. The cuts resultedin a 27% drop in production between
1980 and 1981. The decision to reduce output seems to have been based on
both marketconsiderations(the oil glut) and the government's alreadyexisting huge surplusof revenue. Although Brunei by OPEC standardsis a fairly
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small producer (twenty-thirdin the world), unlike many petroleum states
Brunei has no need for currentextra income. Many of BSP's offshore fields
have naturalgas associated with oil, and according to BSP this decade will
be dominated by gas interests.The gas from the offshore wells is pumped to
the world's largest liquificationplant at Lumut, jointly owned by the Brunei
government, Brunei Shell, and Mitsubishi. More than five million tons of
liquid natural gas (LNG) a year are exported to Japan on a twenty-year
contract (through 1992). Bruneiis, after Indonesia,Japan'smajor supplierof
naturalgas. Brunei'sgas reserves are estimated to be 109 cubic feet or an
energy equivalentgreaterthan its oil reserves.
In 1980, Brunei'stotal exports were valued at B $9.7 billion, of which oil
and naturalgas accounted for 99%.8 The crude oil exports went to nine
customers in the following percentages:Japan (59%);Singapore (10.5%);
United States (10.4%); South Africa (7.8%);Thailand (6.4%o);
Philippines
(1.7%);and Australian and New Zealand each at less than 1%.Although
Japan continues to be the largest single importer of Brunei crude, its share
has been declining while the ASEAN share has increased. Furthermore,it
remainsto be seen whethereventual ASEAN and U.N. membershipwill lead
to the terminationof crude oil sales to South Africa. The value of Brunei's
oil exports has tripled since 1978, a function of price increases,not volume.
All exported LNG goes toJapan and in 1980 was worth B $3 billion.
Brunei has been running ever-increasingbalance-of-trade surpluses despite the necessary importations for the development programs, as Table 1
demonstrates. For the first three quartersof 1981, the surplus was B $800
million less than in the comparableperiod of 1980. This reflects oil production cutbacks. In 1981, SingaporesucceededJapan as Brunei'smajor import
country of origin, followed byJapan, the U.S., and the United Kingdom.
It was the issue of Brunei's wealth in the regional setting that led to the
collapse of an earlier decolonization scheme that would have had Brunei
-enteringthe MalaysianFederationwith Sabah and Sarawakin 1963. Brunei,
aware of the offshore oil and gas potential, did not want to turn over to
Kuala Lumpurat the end of a decade the revenue from the exploitation of
its mineralresources. It should be rememberedthat at this time Malaysia's
own petroleum resourceshad yet to be explored, so that the question of the
division of revenuebetween the centralgovernment and the state was important. The differences between the parties have been trivializedas a dispute
over rank and precedence of the then ruling Brunei Sultan, Sir Omar Ali
Saifuddin, among the Malay potentates. This interpretationcan still rouse
anger as in late 1981, when Tunku Abdul Rahman, who as the Malaysian
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BruneiImports,Exports,and Balanceof Trade(B $)
TradeBalance

Imports

Exports

1975

648,856,668

2,494,805,866

1,845,949,198

1976

642,529,532

3,239,150,975

2,650,621,443

1977

680,407,559

3,999,976,635

3,319,569,076

1978

639,246,103

4,195,209,695

3,555,963,592

1979

862,082,803

5,796,490,159

4,934,407,356

1980

1,230,595,450

9,852,936,235

8,622,340,785

Year

SO U RCE: Brunei, Statisticsof External Trade
NOTE: Exports include reexports.

Prime Minister at the time, almost casually remarkedin his Star (Penang)
newspapercolumn that the negotiations with Bruneifailed because SirOmar
wanted to be the Head of State (Yang Dipertuan Agung). The Brunei government retorted that the reason was that Brunei had not wanted to be a
tribute-paying dependency of Malaya. Although Sir Omar abdicated in
1967, he has remaineda very influentialfigure in the state.
At the same time that Brunei was discussing federation with Kuala Lumpur, traumatic internal political developments occurred. An experiment in
representativegovernment saw A. M. Azahari'sPartaiRakyat Brunei (PRB)
emerge as the dominant popular political force in the state. The PRB's
leadership differed sharply with the Sultan over Brunei's future (the PRB
calling for immediate, unilateralindependence) and internal constitutional
arrangements.In December 1962, the PRB rebelled and aided by the TentaraNasional KalimantanUtara(North KalimantanNational Army),with its
Indonesian connections, briefly seized BSP facilities at Seria. Under the
terms of the 1959 Agreement,the Britishquickly intervenedand crushed the
revolt. The Sultan sternlyput an end to open politics, banned the PRB, and
declared a "Stateof Emergency"that has remainedin force through biennial
renewals. The events of 1962-63 and their aftermathleft lasting marks on
Brunei'spolitics. It explains in part the great value that the Sultanateplaced
on the British security link (and consequent reluctance to move towards
independence);the suspicion held in Bruneiabout the ultimate motives of its
neighbors; and the absence of democratic institutions. As Brunei moves to
independence in an ASEAN framework,the kinds of fears which buttressed
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absolutist isolation aregiving way to greaterconfidence in a Bruneianidentity in a friendly regional environment.Without ASEAN, it might have been
different.
Brunei was set on a course towards independence under the twin pressures of Malaysian hostility and British policy. The Malaysians directed a
two-pronged political attack against the Sultanate.They attempted to "destabilize"the regime through poorly disguised clandestine assistance to the
exiled and illegal PRB, and at the same time belabored the British in the
U.N.'s Fourth Committee for its colonialism and had the issue of Brunei's
independence inscribed on the agenda, despite Brunei'sprotests. Malaysian
policy towards Brunei up to the death of Prime Minister Tun-AbdulRazak
in January 1976 was complicated by personal antagonisms; but more basically, it can be arguedthat Kuala Lumpurhad an implicit interest in the long
run to complete the federation, realistically fearful of the impact of an
independent Brunei on separatisttendencies in Sarawakand Sabah or the
possible spill-over effects of politics in Brunei into the politics of East
Malaysia.The vigor of the Malaysiancampaign to change the Brunei status
quo, together with Malaysia'senthusiastic support for Indonesian intervention in East Timor, led to some speculation that as a "potential security
threat,"Brunei might become Malaysia's"Timor."9
The Malaysianpressureon Bruneiand in the U.N. was congruent with the
British government's desire to terminate its semi-colonial role in Southeast
Asia and, in the frameworkof the drawdown of its militarystrength East of
Suez, reduce its political commitments. As the Britishtried to hasten negotiations with the Sultanateover terminationof the protectorate to the tempo
of Malaysian-sponsoredU.N. resolutions calling for Bruneianindependence
and self-determination,the sticking issue was security. Brunei's unwillingness to sever the British tie stemmed in part from its perception of the
deterrentnature of the physical presence of British militarystrength chiefly
represented by the British-officered,thousand-man-strongGurkha (Nepalese) battalion based in Seria to defend the oil installations. The Sultanate
picks up the annual bill of more than B $5 million a year. The Gurkha's
came in 1962 and have remained, but the 1971 Amended Agreement
changed the functional securityrelationship.Article III stated that subject to
consultation, defense and securitywere tasks to be shared,but that "internal
public order"was a matter of concern only to the public security forces of
the Sultan. In the case of an external threat, the British commitment was
only one to "consult together to determinewhat means should separatelyor
jointly be taken."10The actual deployment of the Gurkhas is historically
conditioned by the events of 1962, which were a matter of internal order
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then covered by the 1959 Agreement.Their actual militaryrole since 1971 is
problematicalalthough they might have symbolic value.11After tough negotiations it was announced officially on June 30, 1978, that Brunei would
become fully independent at the end of 1983, assuming complete responsibility for its own foreign affairs and defense; the Gurkhas are to be withdrawn by September 1983.
Bruneihas sought to fill the defense gap by quantitativelyand qualitatively strengthening its own forces. The two battalions of the Royal Brunei
Malay Regiment, raised in 1961, are to be augmented by a third infantry
battalion and a prospective composite artilleryregiment. As a sweetener to
the 1978 decision, the British pledged $75 million to reequip the RBMR.
Actually the Britishfinancialcontribution is only a small fraction of Brunei's
defense spending. Although the figures are tightly held, it is estimated that at
least a third of Brunei'sexpendituresare on defense. From a level of B $100
million in 1975, spending reached B $500 million in 1981. In the five years
1978-82, nearly B $2 billion will have gone to acquire modern weapons
systems such as the British "Rapier"missiles, fast-attacknaval craft carrying
the French Exocet missiles, helicopter gun ships armed with Swiss 81 mm
air-to-groundrockets, and Scorpion tanks. Brunei's defense spending as a
percentage of its budget is the highest in the ASEAN region.
Even though money might not be any object in Brunei's security planning, the demographic realityis that there is a very small human pool from
which indigenous forces can be drawn. Already the role of women in the
defense forces is increasing,but the limits to expansion of personnel given
the other claims on the labor force is a real constraint.One partialsolution is
recruitmentof mercenaryforces. Today, a substantial part of fixed installation security is provided by a privately recruited force of Gurkhas, freeing
the RBMR soldiers for other duties. Also there remainsin Bruneisome hope
that it might still be possible to work out an arrangementthat would prolong the presence of the Gurkha battalion or, failing that, to maintainsome
sort of Britishdefense commitment, at least in a general way. The analogy of
the Five Power Defence Agreement comes to mind.
The best guarantee of Brunei's security is to be found in the kind of
internationalorder in which it will become independent. Malaysia was not
the only interested party in the evolution of Brunei politics. Post-Sukarno
Indonesia shudderedat the prospect of any kind of radicalregime emerging
in Bandar Seri Begawan and was not particularlyhappy with Kuala Lumpur's backing of the PRB even if Kuala Lumpurthought it could control the
outcome. Indonesia would not tolerate any Brunei regime that might become the base for subversive acts against Indonesia. Nor did Indonesia
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endorse any kind of Malaysian federation solution to the decolonization
questionJakarta made it clear to Malaysiaat an informal Heads-of-Government meeting at Labuan in May 1978 that Indonesia wanted Brunei to be
discussed first in the context of regional security and stability. Although
Indonesia denies any desire to interferein Bruneianaffairs,Indonesia nevertheless claims to be one of the countries responsible for security in the
ASEAN area, including Brunei. In this role Jakarta indicated that it was
preparedto provide training for Brunei security forces in a way "to contribute to the creation of a good atmosphere for political development in
Brunei."12

From the outset Indonesia has made it plain that its preference was for
Brunei's inclusion in ASEAN. Reportedly, President Suharto had that message conveyed to the Sultan in June 1978, via Singapore's Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew. Closer ties were forged during the Sultan's "unofficial"visit
to Jakartain April 1981. Senior Indonesian officials were quoted as assuring
Brunei of its support for ASEAN membership, describing the Sultan's visit
as "verysignificant in shaping a regional order based on peace, stability, and
harmonious relations."13Perhaps with memories of "confrontation" in
mind, the Sultan was not accompanied by any British advisors on hisJakarta
trip. Prince Mohammed Bolkieh in his address to the 1981 ASEAN Foreign
Minister'smeeting took special note of the "firmsupport"given to Brunei's
ASEAN membership by President Suharto.
Indonesian sponsorship of Brunei's independence in an ASEAN framework works to Brunei'sadvantage diplomatically as it redefines its relationship with Malaysia in a process that has moved forward surprisinglyrapidly
and positively. It is to the credit of Malaysia'sformer Prime Minister, Datuk
Hussein Onn, that past irritationshave been resolved. When his government
took office in 1976, he had not been involved in the events scarringBruneiMalaysian relations. Furthermore,even though Sir Omar had abdicated,
Datuk Hussein was aware of his continued great influence and sensitive to
the issues of personal relations. While continuing to press for decolonization, the MalaysianPM sought to establish a viable relationshipwith Brunei
based on mutual interest and political equality. The efforts were rewarded
when Foreign Minister Rithauddin went to Brunei in February1979, after
the independence agreement had been signed, to convey Malaysia's desire
for a new era of friendship with the Sultanate.This was the first official visit
of a Malaysian federal minister since the 1968 coronation of Sultan Sir
Muda Hassanal and was viewed in Brunei as "a historic gesture of goodwill"14 (Hussein Onn, himself, was invited to Brunei for the wedding of the
Sultan's sister in July 1979). The initial Malaysian "wooing" of Brunei
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reached its climax when the Sultan traveledto MalaysiainJuly 1980 for the
installation of the new Yang Dipertuan Agung, his "Polo diplomacy" partner, the Sultan of Pahang.During this visit, the first in 17 years by a Brunei
ruler, the Sultan had four days of discussion with Malaysian officials that
established a satisfactorybasis for a pattern of social, economic, and political exchanges that in the space of a few short months made Malaysia an
importantpartnerof Brunei,not an adversary.
With respect to inter-Borneorelations,a significant event was the visit to
BandarSeri Bagawan in March 1981 by the SarawakChief Minister Tan Sri
Abdul Rahman Yakub. It was described as memorable, opening "a new
15 It occurred just before Yakub
chapter in the history of the two states."
stepped down as Chief Minister, but he was accompanied on the visit by his
designated successor, Datuk Amar Taib Muhammad, formerly FederalTerritory Minister in the central government. The Yakub visit marked the end
of an era of official hostility between Brunei and Sarawak that began in
1970, when Yakub,the newly named Chief Minister, scornfully rejected the
Limbangclaim, after which Bruneicut off Sarawak'soverland connection to
the district.
The Malaysian ring was closed with an exchange of visits between Sabah's Chief Minister, Datuk Harris Salleh, and the Brunei Sultan. Datuk
Harrisattended the thirty-fifthbirthdaycelebration for the Sultan in August
1981. This visit was reciprocatedby the first official visit of a Brunei Sultan
to a Malaysianstate the next month. More informal relations with Sabah's
Chief Minister exist in the form of business enterprisesin which both the
Brunei royal family and the Sabah leader have interests. The symbol of
Borneo reconciliation may be seen in the "FriendshipRoad," which will be,
when completed, the first road through Brunei, linking Sarawakand Sabah.
The road is, according to Sabah'sDatuk Harris,an example of East Malaysia
and Brunei assisting each other, "in the spirit of ASEAN."'6
A series of Malaysia-Brunei technical and administrative exchanges
through 1981 and into 1982 laid the base for the March 1982 visit to Brunei
of MalaysianDeputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam. The two states finalized
agreementson cooperation in a numberof fields. Musa told his Bruneihosts
of Malaysia's "keenness to see Brunei joining the community of nations,
particularlyASEAN, as well as the Islamic Conference Organization."17 Malaysia will give facilities for the administrativetrainingof Bruneiofficials and
hold open more places in Malaysiantertiaryeducation institutions for Bruneian students. Defense cooperation seems to be envisaged as well. Brunei's
acting Menteri Besar Pehin Haji Abdul Aziz and his team spent ten days in
Kuala Lumpur in January 1982 to discuss, among other items, Malaysian
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assistancein trainingBruneiforces. Alreadya RBMR goodwill visit has been
made to Sarawak, and joint naval exercises in the South China Sea are
scheduled.
The developing network of Malaysia-Bruneimodern economic, political,
and social ties is based on a foundation of shared cultural, linguistic, and
religious values. With such underpinnings, Malaysia bids well to replace
Singaporeas Brunei'sunofficial mentor in ASEAN. The Singapore relationship has been very important.It gave Brunei a regional window that, next to
London, provided access to the world. Singaporeis an importantsite for the
trainingof Bruneicivilian and militarypersonnel, and is Brunei'strade entrepot. A substantialpart of Brunei'ssurpluswealth is invested in and through
Singapore.There is also the security link. A Singapore Armed Forces infantry or artillerybattalion is regularlyrotated through Brunei for jungle training in TemburongDistrict. The public record does not show whether the
Singapore battalion has a defense function for Brunei, but it is instructive
that plans for the third RBMR infantry battalion call for it to be based in
Temburong. It is problematical whether Singapore Armed Forces will be
able to operate in the future in Bruneigiven Malaysian(and perhapsIndoneslan) reservations.
Both Singapore and Malaysia have been involved in tutoring Brunei in
ASEAN and world affairs.The 1981 SingaporeU.N. delegation had a Bruneian attached to it while Malaysia'sdelegation to the 1981 Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meeting included a Bruneian.Singaporeconducted a
special seminaron the workings of ASEAN for Brunei in September 1981,
and the Brunei Agency in Singaporeis the basis for future diplomatic representation. Malaysia and Brunei have exchanged RepresentativeOffices having diplomatic status, and Brunei has a rice-purchasingmission in Bangkok.
In April 1981, the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister made the first high-level
official Thai visit to BandarSeri Begawan. "Asfar as Thailandis concerned,"
he said, "we will be happy if Brunei joins ASEAN and takes part in its
activities after it becomes independent."'18
Currentplanning suggests that in
addition to London, Kuala Lumpur,and Singapore,diplomatic missions will
be opened inJapan and the United States. As in all other areasof administrative services, foreign affairs staffing will be a problem with senior officials
doing double or triple duty. This is an area in which recruitmentof expatriates is no solution.
A possible first legal step towards ASEAN membership for an independent Bruneiwould appearto be accession to the 1976 Treatyof Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopted by the ASEAN states at the Bali
Summit. The treaty provides for the pacific settlement of disputes among
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the contracting partiesand is open for accession by other states in Southeast
Asia.19Theoretically, a Southeast Asian state could become a party to the
treaty without becoming a member of ASEAN-indeed, this provision was
designed with Vietnam in mind. It is doubtful, however, that ASEAN membershipwould be granted to a non-signatory state. Brunei'saccession to the
treaty would bring it within an emerging legal regime in Southeast Asia in
which the signatories have pledged that they "shall not in any manner or
form participatein any activity which shall constitute a threatto the political
and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorialintegrity of another High
Contracting Party"(Article 10). Such a regime would certainly provide a
normative framework responsive to Brunei's security concerns while the
political dynamic of ASEAN "concord" and "solidarity"gives policy substance to peaceful relations among ASEAN states. In one sense it could be
said that Brunei'semergence as a fully independent member of ASEAN in
1984 will be one of the fruits of the ASEAN political community whose
charterwas laid down at the Bali Summit.
The progressmade in integratingBruneiinto the regional system does not
mean that all problems are solved. Stumbling blocks still remain in the
bilateralMalaysia-Bruneirelationship, but these have not been allowed to
interferewith the development of the rapprochement.The question of the
Limbang claim immediately comes to mind, since this has not been abandoned by Brunei. The existence of the claim in itself should not be disruptive so long as neitherparty wishes to make an issue of it. But there is some
feeling on the Malaysian side that the termination of the Limbang claim
would have felicitous consequences in relation to the protracted dispute
with the Philippines over sovereignty in Sabah. A second potential area of
dispute between Bruneiand Malaysialies in the demarcationof their respective continental shelves. Malaysia'smap of its continental shelf, gazetted in
December 1979, ignores Brunei's shelf proclaimed in 1954. The Malaysian
claim treats the shelf as uninterrupted from Sabah to Sarawak-i.e., as
though Bruneidid not exist. The question of the boundarieshas been raised
by Brunei through London, but Malaysia has indicated that this is an issue
for independent Brunei.There is no evidence that the issue of the Limbang
claim and Malaysianmaritimejurisdictionhave been connected. A possible
future problem of jurisdiction would occur if Brunei followed all of the
other ASEAN states by adopting the 320-kilometer (200-mile) Exclusive
Economic Zone adjacent to its territorialsea. Brunei then would overlap
with the other disputants in the South China Sea area.
Brunei's independence and ASEAN membership will undoubtedly have
consequences for its internalpolitics. The state is an absolute monarchywith
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power tightly held by the royal family. In many respects Brunei's government is more like that of a PersianGulf than a Southeast Asian state. The
state of emergency continues. The LegislativeCouncil is nominated. Internal
security has high police priority. Although the Sultan has become much
more visible in the past two years as a reigning, modernizing monarch, it
remainsto be seen whetherthe kinds of political pressuresfor popularaccess
to power, represented,for example, by the PRB, can be indefinitelyresisted.
There are two thousand or more Bruneiansstudying abroad.The non-royals
are the great majorityamong them, and a rising political consciousness will
be carriedback to Brunei. Almost in anticipation of challenge, a new Internal Security Act has been promulgated that provides for preventive detention for two years renewableat the pleasureof the Sultan and not subject to
appeal to any court.
Brunei'sASEAN membershipwill have certain consequences for the Association itself. In the firstplace, it will solidify the Malay-Indonesiancultural heart of ASEAN. Second, it will change Singapore's status as ASEAN's
"mini-state."ASEAN's proceduralpatternof site rotation of importantcommittees may have to be altered given expected staffing problems in Brunei.
Many of the administrativeand technical aspects of ASEAN participationby
Brunei will be solved on an ad hoc basis. This may be another argument in
favor of ASEAN's structuralflexibility.
Brunei is becoming independent in a Southeast Asia that continues to be
an areaof local- and great-powerconflict. The process of integratingBrunei
into ASEAN is taking place simultaneously with the ASEAN-Indochina
confrontation. It is at this level of extra-ASEAN interactionthat the security
aspects of Brunei's membership in the Association have a regional dimension. A vulnerableBrunei will to some extent be insulated from the currents
of competition through its absorption into the established pattern of
ASEAN orientations, and its potential for becoming a venue for new conflict will be reduced. There are of course new risks for Brunei, but these
seem more manageablefor a Brunei in ASEAN than a Brunei trying to go it
alone.

Notes
1. The Bangkok Declaration simply states "that the Association is open to participationof
all states in the South East Asian region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles, and purposes."
2. The full text of Prince Mohammed's speech is given in Pelita Bruznei,
June 24, 1981.
3. State of Brunei, Annual Report1970, p. 400.
4. Kajian PertamaBanchi Perumahandan PendudukBrunei 1981. The provisional results of
the census may be subject to some minor upward adjustments following computer
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processing, but the total is not expected to go beyond 193,000. The great gap between
the estimated population figure and the actual figure is partiallyexplained by the interpolation between 1974 and 1976 of figures for thousands of temporary immigrant construction workers that were never adjusted out of the base for extrapolation. Previous
census data and yearlyestimates are presented in the BruneiStatistical Yearbook
1977/1978
(Statistics Section, Economic Planning Unit, State Secretariat,Brunei, 1980).
The treaty and notes are printed as CMND/7496 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary
Office, 1979).
T. M. Burley, "Brunei:ASEAN's Reluctant Independent," Insight, (December 1981), p.
38.
To July 1, 1981, the oil production figure is 1,644,801,930 barrels, with oil reserves
estimated at 1,630,000,000 barrels(Oil and GasJournal,December 28, 1981, p. 56). Also
the statement by BSP's technical director that if the "scope for additions to recoverable
reserves,"i.e., speculative estimates, are added to established reserves, the total is not far
short of the total quantity so far produced (Petroleumdi Brunei, 2, 1981, p. 4).
All trade statistics are derived from Brunei's Statisticsof External Trade,preparedannually by the Statistics Section, Economic Planning Unit, Brunei State Secretariat.
For an analysis of Malaysian policy towards Brunei to 1976, see Michael Leifer, "Decolonization and International Status: The Experience of Brunei," International Affairs
(London), 54:2 (April 1978), pp. 240-252.
Text of the Agreement is given in Brunei Enactment No. 1 of 1972 (Brunei Gazette,
1972).
For a critical analysis of the role of the Gurkhas, see Hamzah Ahmad, "Oil and Security
SoutheastAsia, 2:2 (September 1980), pp. 182-191.
in Brunei,"Contemporary
Gen. Ali Moertopo as reported by Jakarta Radio, May 24, 1978.
BorneoBulletin, April 18, 1981.
Ibid., December 10, 1979.
Ibid., March 28, 1981.
Ibid., December 5, 1981.
New Straits Times,March 20, 1982.
Straits Times,March 19, 1981.
See the discussion of the treaty in Purification Valera-Quisumbing,"Can ASEAN Forge
a Viable Legal Regime for Regional Cooperation?," PhilippinesLawJournal, 56:2 (June
1981), pp. 209-224.

